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Abstract 
The COVID-19 pandemic has led to intense conversations about ventilator allocation and 
reallocation during a crisis standard of care. Multiple voices in the media and multiple state 
guidelines mention reallocation as a possibility. Drawing upon a range of neuroscientific, 
phenomenological, ethical, and socio-political considerations, we argue that taking away 
someone’s personal ventilator is a direct assault on their bodily and social integrity. We conclude 
that personal ventilators should not be part of reallocation pools and that triage protocols should 
be immediately clarified and explicitly state that personal ventilators will be protected in all 
cases. 
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Introduction 
 
The COVID-19 pandemic has led to intense conversations about ventilator 
allocation and reallocation during a crisis standard of care (CSC). The ethical 
value of maximizing lives saved in a pandemic has received widespread support 
from clinicians and bioethicists for years, so much so that some consider it a 
fundamental tenet of public health ethics. In the last few months, however, 
approaches that prioritize maximization of life have received repeated and notable 
challenges.1 One reason for such pushback is the implication that patients who 
could benefit from a ventilator might have the ventilator withheld or withdrawn if 
triage officers/teams decide that more patients could be saved by taking it from 
them.2 This reasoning could extend to ventilators outside the hospital setting; if 
more lives could be saved by taking advantage of chronic-use ventilators in the 
community, then it would follow that these ventilators should be part of allocation 
schemas. 
  
This is not a mere academic point. The Food and Drug Administration issued 
guidance for modifying home- and facility-use ventilators as needed for the 
COVID-19 pandemic.3 In New York, the federal government continually refused 
to provide needed support and the COVID-19 pandemic overwhelmed hospitals 
so severely that Governor Cuomo authorized the National Guard to take control of 
excess community ventilators, announcing his plan in an April briefing that 
caused some alarm.4 As another example, multiple hospitals approached a nursing 
home in Long Island, requesting access to unused ventilators; the first hospital to 
make the request received eleven ventilators, leaving the facility with only five on 
hand for current and future residents.5 Even outside of New York, healthcare 
systems globally are having to find ways to increase supplies and plan for CSC. 
Bioethicists, healthcare professionals, and public agencies must pay attention to 
this concern and clarify promptly: Are personal ventilators (PVs) part of the 
reallocation pool during a pandemic like COVID-19, or not? In this paper, we 
focus on the primary ethical question that underlies such a decision: should they 
be or not? 
 
We argue that PVs should not be part of reallocation pools and that triage 
protocols should be immediately clarified and explicitly state that PVs will be 
protected in all cases. As important as we take our primary argument to be, we 
take the issues raised by PVR to have biomedical, ethical, and philosophical 
import far beyond crisis standards of care in the time of COVID-19. First, as we 
will discuss at length, there is an urgent moral need for explicit policies 
concerning ventilator reallocation at the institutional, state, and, ideally, also the 
federal level. Second, PVR raises crucial symbolic issues concerning the 
historically fraught relationship between the norms of biomedical and public 
health practices and the needs and well-being of the larger disability community.6  
 
We begin by analyzing phenomenological, neuroscientific, ethical, and socio-
political considerations pertaining to the experience of long-term ventilator users, 
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the analysis of which leads us to argue that ventilators should be considered as an 
integrated technology: a technology that is essential to one’s functioning across 
the life course and part of one’s social identity. We then discuss the ways in 
which integrated technologies such as ventilators have become powerful symbols 
concerning the worth of disabled lives amidst this political and existential crisis. 
Heeding the fact that multiple values are at play when CSC are triggered, in the 
next section we analyze four potential scenarios of PVR during a pandemic as 
well as the ethical considerations of each. In conclusion, we discuss the larger 
implications of our argument that reallocating PVs under any circumstances 
grossly violates bodily and social integrity and conflicts with longstanding 
biomedical principles and guidelines. 
 
 
THE BACKGROUND OF PVR DEBATES 
For the purposes of our discussion, the acronym ‘PV’ refers to ventilators that 
individuals use in their homes, whether that be private homes in a community or 
in long-term care environments such as group homes and nursing homes. A 
person’s financial relationship to these ventilators may differ – e.g., one might 
rent, borrow, or own their ventilators, and this relationship is likely mediated by 
health insurance. Some bioethicists suggest that whether a ventilator is “rented 
from a device company” and whether there is “legal ownership” are ethically 
salient for claims to the ventilator during a pandemic.7 For reasons we defend 
below, we take the nature of the financial relationship to be immaterial to the 
personal sense of ownership that a ventilator user experiences and the ethical 
considerations thereof. 
 
The possibility of personal ventilator reallocation (PVR) through a triage process 
is a source of profound concern for people who rely on ventilators in their 
everyday life. Alice Wong, a disability activist and a long-term vent user, explains 
this concern: “Were I to contract coronavirus, I imagine a doctor might read my 
chart, look at me, and think I’m a waste of their efforts and precious resources 
that never should have been in shortage to begin with. He might even take my 
ventilator for other patients who have a better shot at survival than me.”8 While 
states and individual institutions vary in their PVR policies,9 discussion of PVR 
has been covered in the media and implanted as a concern in disability 
communities. The introduction of this possibility—that one could go to the 
hospital to receive acute care services and end up without access to the life-
sustaining device that they have constant access to at home—is a valid deterrent 
to going to the hospital when otherwise necessary. Moreover, silence on an issue 
during a public health crisis can be critical; the nature of a crisis is such that, 
without clear guardrails, options that are ethically problematic can remain on the 
table in policy discussions and then lead to action. As a result, we contend that 
there can no longer be neutral, or assumed, defaults in ventilator triage policies.  
 
Our analysis is part of a debate that has existed for over a decade about how 
chronic use ventilators should factor into triage decisions during a public health 
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disaster. The 2009 Guidance for Establishing Crisis Standards of Care for Use in 
Disaster Situations by the Institute of Medicine (now National Academy of 
Medicine) describes early stages of this debate. According to this report, the 
World Health Organization at the time argued that “chronic care patients should 
be included with all other patients in triage protocols, holding that all must share 
the sacrifice involved in triage equally,” whereas the Veterans Health 
Administration “found that viable ethical arguments could support either 
position,” though they ultimately chose to exclude PVs from reallocation.10  
 
Recently in The New York Times, Ari Ne’eman claimed that the 2015 New York 
triage guidelines would “permit hospitals to take away ventilators from those who 
use them on an ongoing basis in the community or at a long-term care facility if 
they seek hospital care.”11 Joseph Fins, who served on the Task Force responsible 
for these guidelines, refuted this characterization of the Task Force’s 
recommended ventilator reallocation process, though the exchange between 
Ne’eman and Fins underscores the importance of clarity and transparency.12 In the 
past few months, complaints of disability discrimination in triage protocols in 
Kansas and New York were submitted to the U.S. Department of Health and 
Human Services Office of Civil Rights, explicitly asking for protection of PVs 
from reallocation.13 Months into the COVID-19 pandemic, the New England 
Journal of Medicine published a Perspective piece that advises against PVR in 
light of disability discrimination complaints, though the ethical reasons for this 
recommendation are ultimately left unaddressed—the comment is instead a single 
sentence assertion.14 Other bioethicists have left it an open question to what extent 
PVR should be permitted, raising some doubts about “legitimate” claims and 
expectations of PV users.15  
WHAT IS THE LIVED EXPERIENCE OF A PERSONAL VENTILATOR? 
One of the more established values of medical practice is respect for patient 
autonomy, including respect for patient’s bodily integrity. While there are many 
grey areas in medicine, it is typically taken as a given that infringing on a 
patient’s bodily integrity should only occur under exceptional circumstances. Yet, 
what if a patient’s body extends beyond the skin? Is a guide dog part of a patient’s 
body? What about an implanted cardioverter-defibrillator or a cochlear implant? 
This is the dilemma faced by people who live with ventilators: will medical 
professionals view their ventilator as a part of their body and something to be 
carefully respected or as a mere object they use that can be taken away? It is hard 
to overstate the personal terror wrought from the suggestion that PVs could be 
taken away in a triage process, but to fully appreciate why this causes such terror 
requires better understanding the lived experience of long-term ventilator users. If 
medical providers, health policy experts, and others who play a role in decision-
making concerning PVR wish to make informed and ethically defensible 
decisions, then attention to how long-term ventilator users experience their 
ventilator must be heeded. 
Reynolds, Guidry-Grimes, and Savin   Against Personal Ventilator Reallocation 
 
Forthcoming in Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 30(2) 2021 
4 
Recent neuroscientific studies suggest that the multisensory mechanisms 
representing peripersonal space do not depend merely upon bodily activity or 
upon active use of non-bodily items such as tools. On the contrary, peripersonal 
space is a question of the processing of information resulting from organism-
environment interactions. For example, Galli et al., who focus on the use of a 
wheelchair, argue that a wheelchair “can be conceived as a whole body tool, 
enabling extended interaction between the person and the environment, thus 
extending peripersonal space boundaries.”16 However, they note that “counter-
intuitively, such effect was not induced by active use of the wheelchair in healthy 
participants who never used a wheelchair before (even if they subjectively 
reported to “embody” the wheelchair)” (idem). Tellingly, to merely use an object 
for some discrete period of time is not sufficient for it to become a part of the 
proprioceptive sensing of an organism.17 That is to say, there is a crucial 
distinction between using an artifact, becoming habituated to using an artifact, 
and having become habituated to using it to the point of incorporating it into 
one’s experience of one’s body itself.18 Seen in this light, long-term ventilator use 
is not ultimately a question of becoming habituated to the use of a ventilator, but 
instead of bodily incorporation of the ventilator. 
Still, this argument alone does not decide the matter of PVR. We are not primarily 
concerned with whether a person senses or perceives their ventilator as a part of 
their body, but, instead, whether or not such a sensation can act as the foundation 
of a moral claim that removing their ventilator is a moral harm, including a harm 
that infringes on their bodily integrity. That is to say, as insightful as 
phenomenological and biological insights are, they do not, on their own, answer 
the ethical problem at hand. 
To answer that question requires a different analytic toolset. Consider the widely 
used distinction between curative and assistive technologies. Curative 
technologies are typically taken to be technological artifacts that contribute to a 
person’s shift towards comparatively ‘normal’ or ‘healthy’ forms of being, 
whereas assistive technologies are typically taken to be merely additive and 
helpful with respect to how one is. In “The Distinction Between Curative and 
Assistive Technology,” Joseph Stramondo argues that this distinction is untenable 
if thought in terms of an extensional or intensional definition.19 The reason for 
this is that the meaning of the technologies in question do not turn on what the 
respective concepts are taken to pick out, but instead upon the relationship that a 
given technology has to one’s “relational narrative identity as a member of one of 
two social groups: disabled people or non-disabled people.”20 Stramondo’s claims 
situate social and dialogical factors relative to politicized identities as definitive—
as opposed to biological, phenomenological, and psychological factors. 
This is an insightful argument in many respects, but we wonder whether it 
appropriately extends to the case at hand. Does the permanent use of a ventilator 
turn, when all is said and done, solely on the story one tells about oneself and/or 
which others tell about one? It seems as though the distinction between 
therapeutic and assistive technology as tethered to relational narrative identity is 
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insufficient to fully capture the normative dimensions of the use of a technology 
like a long-term ventilator. 
We suggest that the meaning of a ventilator for a long-term ventilator user should 
instead be construed neither in terms of a therapeutic, nor assistive technology, 
but instead in terms of what we call an integrated technology. More specifically, 
it is a corporeally integrated technology. While the meaning of a ventilator for a 
long-term user is certainly determined by their relational narrative identity, as 
Stramondo’s work rightly suggests, the moral stakes of the relationship between 
the user and the ventilator is not reducible to that.21 This is because without this 
technology, the person would die or would be thrown into a medically dangerous 
situation. This is part of the reason that ventilators should be treated as prima 
facie morally distinct from other sorts of similar technologies. Let us unpack this 
argument further. 
In his essay, “Prosthetic Embodiment,” Sean Aas argues that dominant accounts 
of the moral status of prosthetic or other sorts of bodily extensions fail to motivate 
expected normative concerns—they don’t tell us why we should care about 
damaging or taking away someone’s prosthetic leg, for example, in the ways that 
most would expect.22 After analyzing why phenomenological, neuroscientific, and 
biological accounts such as we are analyzing here fail to provide such ethical 
considerations—why they don’t tell us how we should distinguish between 
morally meaningful bodily and non-bodily parts—Aas articulates a solution: “to 
be a body part is to be the sort of thing that ought to be protected, in a certain 
way, by social practices.” 
The question then immediately arises: which practices support which sort of 
social practices in question? “Following arguments from Anita Silvers and other 
philosophers of disability,” Aas continues, “the thing that social institutions ought 
to protect, in this bodily way, are those things that are critical to our functioning 
as equals in our actual social world” (idem). But the philosophical weight is then 
left on the adjective “critical.” And, furthermore, Aas’ response does not 
substantively address questions of how we adjudicate debates over what is critical 
and non-critical. 
This is understandable, for such debates are storied and difficult. Consider the 
following phenomenon: personal computer use, equal representation within a 
democratic republic, the ability to metabolize the amino acid phenylalanine, 
access to basic healthcare services, prostheses for lower-limb amputees, and 
eyeglasses. To determine which of these “are critical to our functioning as equals 
in our actual social world” and which are not goes to the heart of debates over 
justice and equity and which—assuming one is operating under real, non-ideal 
conditions—are very hard to answer. 
We think, however, that Aas in fact offers a path forward later on in the paper. In 
a footnote addressing Carter and Palermos’ work on the ethics of extended 
cognition, he distinguishes between “acts that ought to count as offenses against 
the person because they are interference with items that realize cognition” vs. 
those items that “interfere in cognition.” Switching from the issue of cognition to 
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pulmonary functioning, a ventilator, for a long-term user, is not something which 
merely interferes (positively) in pulmonary function, but which realizes livable 
pulmonary function for them. To bring together both Stramondo’s and Aas’s 
analyses, then, we can say that what it means to call a ventilator an integrated 
technology is as follows: integrated technologies are essential to one’s 
functioning, not merely in acute situations, but across one’s future life course, and 
they are part of one’s relational narrative identity. 
Someone might object that there could be a long-term ventilator user who resents 
using their ventilator, who feels alienated from this equipment. Instead of being 
part of the story they tell about themselves, it is a facet of their life they 
downplay, ignore, or otherwise diminish. Yet, even in such a case, it is a part of 
their relational narrative identity—they have to tell a story about it. Refusing to 
tell that story or to incorporate various aspects of it does not mean that that story 
or the parts in question are not constitutive, on at least some integral level, of 
one’s larger identity—again, even if through refusal or active denial. The 
ventilator shapes daily interactions and the conditions for living, making a 
narrative relationship with it mandatory. 
Another reason why a ventilator has to be part of one’s relational narrative 
identity, even if through the mode of refusal, is that it is not simply functionally 
essential, but it is so in a socially obtrusive way.23 Ventilators, based on current 
technologies, cannot be hidden; on the contrary, ventilators are the sort of thing 
that one has to explain or that are simply taken as an aspect of another’s relational 
identity, even if that persons wishes them not to be so, as discussed above. 
It is for all these reasons that a ventilator for a long-term user is in many respects 
categorically different from other sorts of medical technology. Given these 
neuroscientific, phenomenological, ethical, and interpersonal reasons, taking a 
ventilator away from a long-term user is more akin to taking away a part of their 
body and a part of their identity. That is to say, it is more akin to violating both 
bodily and what we term “social integrity” than it is to taking away a device that 
someone merely “uses.” 
Still, someone might object that this account doesn’t hold for someone who 
recently started using a long-term ventilator. This objection assumes that the 
meaning of the ventilator for that person begins at the moment they start using it, 
but this assumption is misguided. A person who ends up using a long-term 
ventilator is unlikely to have that option presented to them out of the blue. On the 
contrary, they were likely on a complicated medical trajectory that led up to their 
use of such a device. Being discharged with a long-term ventilator is part of a 
process that most people would have been on for quite some time. While the harm 
against someone who has been using a long-term ventilator for a few hours or 
days would certainly be different in degree than someone who has been using one 
for ten or twenty years, we contend that it would not ultimately be different in 
kind—specifically given the way in which long-term ventilator use constitutes an 
integrated technology as we have defined that term. 
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To summarize, what commits us to grant moral status to objects such as 
ventilators for long-term users, artifacts that are admittedly not prima facie part of 
one’s ‘biological’ body, is whether or not they are integrated in the sense of both 
participating in and realizing the essential functions of their biological life and the 
narrative relational identity of their social life. Following Aas, we leave the 
ultimate meaning of “essential” (or, as he terms it, “critical”) undefined in any 
technical sense and following Stramondo, we leave the ultimate meaning of 
“identity” similarly undefined in any technical sense, but we do so because we 
think that further specifications of those terms do not undermine our central 
argument. To put things in an overly simplistic manner, it is neither up for debate 
that the ability to breathe is essential for human organisms, nor that extrinsic, 
socially conspicuous devices affording such essential abilities will become a part 
of the story one and others tells about oneself. 
The research we have engaged and the arguments we have put forward lead us to 
the following conclusion: taking away someone’s ventilator is a direct assault on 
their bodily and social integrity. It is morally akin to taking away a part of their 
physical body and a part of their social identity. Respect for patient autonomy as 
well as bodily and social integrity demands that PVs not be taken from those who 
use them. Even replacements of ventilator devices—due to conditions where 
shifting to a different type of ventilator device is medically indicated—should be 
done in careful, considerate consultation with patients. 
 MEDICAL DECISION-MAKING, SYMBOLISM, AND DISABILITY 
As far as these arguments take us, they do not address an equally important 
consideration: the public, symbolic importance of debates over and decisions 
concerning PVR. It is one thing to claim that PVR is wrong from a biomedical or 
philosophical lens; it is another to appreciate the harms that even suggestions of 
PVR can cause at the larger level of public discourse and the public imaginary, 
especially in light of centuries of disregard, disparagement, and far worse forms 
of treatment of numerous communities of people with disabilities both in the 
United States and abroad.24  
In this light, it is no surprise that ventilators have become a focal point of resource 
triage debates and advocacy in many disability communities and have in many 
ways taken on symbolic meaning amounting to the perception of one’s social 
worth – whether people are “worth saving” and whether they live “lives worth 
living,” to invoke the language of the Third Reich’s T4 program.25 As horror 
stories emerged from Italy about ventilator shortages and the painful act of 
deciding who would or would not receive a ventilator were recounted, the 
prospect of triaging ventilators was highly anticipated in the United States. The 
pandemic has underscored and compounded long-standing health inequities in the 
USA, especially in Black and Latinx communities, including lack of access to 
testing and health information; lack of access to routine, primary care, and 
increased exposure to the virus due to lack of personal protective equipment 
(PPE) and disproportionate numbers of frontline, “essential” workers.26 Still, 
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public discourse and broadly publicized communication amongst elected officials 
have continued to highlight not the role of systemic inequality and measures to 
address it, but instead concerns about supply-side issues such as PPE and 
ventilator access. The outsized presence of ventilators in the media magnifies 
their symbolism as the machine that gives access to life when all else is lost. New 
York Governor Andrew Cuomo declared in mid-March, 2020, “Ventilators are to 
this war what missiles were to World War II,” adding a touch of patriotism to the 
state’s efforts to procure ventilators.27  
The COVID-19 pandemic is not the first time that breathing has taken on greater 
meaning than its mechanical function, to its meaning as a necessary life force. In 
the case of the brutal murder of unarmed Black man Eric Garner in New York 
City in 2014, police put Mr. Garner in a choke hold that suffocated him. Videos of 
the attack recorded his final words, “I can’t breathe,” a phrase which he repeated 
eleven times as he was choked to death.28 Later, when swells of outraged people 
filled the streets protesting the senseless killing, these three words were repeated 
as rallying cries, on signs, and as a protest hashtag on social media. Again in 
2020, when Minneapolis police suffocated another unarmed Black man, George 
Floyd, the scene was recorded by video and his last words reverberated across the 
nation: “I can’t breathe.”29 The words became a rallying cry again, representing 
the systematic denial of breath and therefore life. 
Air, lungs, breathing and, now, ventilators have long been symbols for essential 
life and hope. Once used as a means of determining death, the ability to breathe is 
a fundamental part of human life.30 Though biomedical advancement from the 
iron lung to the ventilator has provided alternative mechanisms for exchanging 
oxygen and carbon dioxide, one’s capacity to breathe is so fundamental to life it 
remains one indicator for brain death.31 In Sontag’s discussion of the metaphors 
associated with tuberculosis, she suggests a “disease of the lung” is a “disease of 
the soul,” so that even in its metaphoric form, the organ responsible for breathing 
is all-encompassing.32  
Thus, any discussion of ventilators is inevitably going to provoke strong 
reactions. As this pandemic has laid bare and exposed the deep societal inequities, 
discussions of triage protocol related to socially constructed identities, such as 
that of disability, may seem like a referendum on the worth of the lives of these 
groups. Discourse throughout this pandemic has continually rendered disabled 
communities as other, and also often as lesser, than the non-disabled, working-
age adult. At the start of the pandemic, news reports repeatedly assured listeners 
that “only older people and people with underlying conditions” have suffered 
critical illness and deaths from COVID-19. In response, many disabled activists 
wrote critiques with sarcastic comments such as, “Don’t they know we can 
read?”33  
Similarly, the discussions about PVR struck fear into long-term ventilator users 
and their loved ones that rippled across disability communities. The fact that PV’s 
were ever a point of contention is not likely to be forgotten, especially if triage 
protocols never explicitly state that PVs are protected from reallocation. In order 
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to work towards establishing trust in healthcare systems—which is an important 
component of health equity in the present and for the future—the collective 
trauma of the COVID-19 pandemic needs to be a part of our decision-making 
both today and going forward. For disability communities, this may mean 
understanding the fears that may arise around accessing basic care and making 
explicit policies that rebuke particularly charged ideas, such as PVR. 
Public health officials, bioethicists, and healthcare providers must contend with 
the realities of the ventilator as a symbol of life and worth, while not over-
focusing on ventilators in a pandemic response to the detriment of increasing 
access to more basic primary care and PPE. The task for public health messaging 
is to reframe the meaning of a ventilator as a tool that may help in limited, 
specific, situations, yet is not in and of itself indicative of quality of care. There 
are many challenges facing disabled people during this pandemic, and there will 
be many challenges when the world starts to recover. Now that we have detailed a 
number of arguments and considerations objecting to the reallocation of PVs, we 
will turn to address specific scenarios in which the demand for reallocation may 
arise and explore in far more detail how, in our view, clinicians and providers 
should respond. 
CASES FOR CONSIDERATION 
 To better understand how CSC might lead to a PV user not having access to a 
ventilator during a pandemic like COVID-19, and to make our analysis and 
recommendations more concrete, we lay out the following four scenarios. 
 
Scenario 1: 
 
Ventilators intended for chronic use outside of the hospital setting could be 
acquisitioned by hospital systems that are desperate. Local authorities could ask 
chronic care facilities to hand over ventilators that could shore up dire shortages. 
This acquisition could focus on excess ventilators, i.e., those not in use. 
Alternatively, all of the ventilators in these facilities could be considered part of 
the allocation/reallocation pool, even subjecting residents of chronic care facilities 
to a triage process. 
  
Whether retrieving excess ventilators from facilities is ethically permissible 
would depend on whether this would place undue burden on care facilities that 
will likely need those ventilators. Without them, facilities may be less able to take 
new residents (which causes a discharge problem for hospitals), and they may not 
be able to replace faulty ventilators (creating a precarious threat to current 
ventilator users in the facility). A reciprocity agreement between the requesting 
hospital(s) and the facility could help mitigate these concerns. Government 
agencies should explicitly give chronic care facilities the freedom to opt out of 
these arrangements, which means giving some protection against negative 
repercussions to facilities’ funding and public relations if they refuse. If a facility 
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does decide to share their excess ventilators, there should be continual 
communication and evaluation of the facility’s needs, and there should be clear 
triggers for returning ventilators back to the facility to prevent time lags that lead 
to devastating consequences for vulnerable facility residents. 
  
Making all chronic use ventilators part of the reallocation pool has been long-
considered ethically impermissible for several reasons. The 2009 IOM/NAM 
report points out that it would require an unacceptable role reversal for facility 
caregivers and would cause brutal and unjust harm to persons with disabilities.34 
The New York State Task Force and Life and Law Report argues: “To triage 
patients in chronic care facilities once the Guidelines are implemented may 
theoretically maximize resources and result in more lives saved, but conflicts with 
the societal norm of defending vulnerable individuals and communities.” They 
add, “this approach fails to follow the ethical principle of duty to care and could 
be construed as taking advantage of a very vulnerable population.”35  
  
The COVID-19 pandemic has seen this debate resurface, but we agree with the 
New York Task Force that PV users in facilities should not be subjected to 
reallocation for the reasons they suggest, further bolstered by our concerns for 
bodily and social integrity.36 One could counter that PVR in this scenario can be 
ethically acceptable—perhaps even obligatory—when the resident is in a 
prolonged vegetative state; this disorder of consciousness might seem to preclude 
the possibility of the patient ever having a sense of personal ownership over the 
ventilator. In a public health crisis, therefore, it might seem sensible to reallocate 
ventilators for this particular population, so more patients in acute need can be 
saved in the pandemic. We now know, though, that vegetative states are 
commonly misdiagnosed, and recovery can be possible; permanent vegetative 
states are no longer even accepted as a nosological category.37 Furthermore, the 
issue of the protection and medical care of people in such states, however 
medically defined, goes to the heart of disability rights.38 Safeguarding the rights 
to care and recovery of this vulnerable population is therefore still a fundamental 
obligation of healthcare professionals and caregiving facilities, and our concerns 
about bodily and social integrity remain. 
  
Scenario 2: 
 
Whenever a patient comes into the hospital with their PV, the patient might no 
longer be allowed to “lay claim” to that ventilator. The ventilator becomes part of 
the allocation pool for the public good, and the patient might not have their 
ventilator returned to them. 
  
Objections to any such policy are justified.39 This would be akin to seizing 
someone’s vital organ for public use, for all the reasons we have detailed. This 
leaves people who are dependent on their ventilator little choice but to avoid the 
hospital at all costs, especially if the triage criteria mean that they might not 
receive ventilator support during their hospitalization. Furthermore, this scenario 
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would likely cause enormous moral distress for clinicians. To our knowledge, no 
hospital is considering commandeering PVs, even under CSC. Given the immense 
fear surrounding this possibility, hospitals should immediately allay these 
concerns through policies that explicitly eliminate this possibility. 
  
Scenario 3: 
 
Someone who relies on a PV for chronic care could be admitted to the hospital. 
Hospital-based healthcare workers are generally not trained to use home ventilator 
equipment, so they may want to switch out the PV for a hospital ventilator. The 
hospital’s ventilator may be functionally the same as the home ventilator, and the 
patient’s respiratory support is adequately provided by either the PV or the 
hospital ventilator. 
  
The patient should be consulted about their preferences regarding switching out 
ventilators in this scenario, given pervasive fears about PV confiscation under 
CSC. Especially if the type of ventilator in question is scarce, the default should 
be to work with the patient’s own ventilator. This would be a departure of 
standard practice, since usually patients do not use their own equipment when 
they enter the hospital setting, even if they are functionally comparable. If the 
hospital cannot accommodate continued use of the PV for that particular patient, 
the PV should be placed in protected storage; even if the PV could be cleaned and 
repurposed for other patients, the PV should be treated like other personal items 
and not used without the patient’s explicit consent. A ventilator-sharing system 
could be ethically supportable if a PV user cannot continue to use their ventilator 
but another patient would benefit in conditions of scarcity, but this system needs 
numerous safeguards to ensure sharing is voluntary and that the PV does not 
remain in use so long that the PV user has delayed discharge as a result. If a 
patient’s needs are best served by having their own caregiver at the hospital, this 
should be accommodated to the extent possible. 
  
Scenario 4: 
 
A PV user could be admitted to the hospital and develop acute respiratory distress 
syndrome (ARDS) from COVID-19 or another condition. In this scenario, the 
medical team would recommend switching to a ventilator capable of providing 
increased support; namely, switching from a basic ventilator to a full-featured 
ventilator—with COVID-19, oxygenation or precise high FiO2 is a central 
concern. Such a patient would be subject to the same triage process as anyone else 
for the full-featured ventilator, so they may or may not receive the needed 
ventilator in the end. 
  
How likely this scenario is will depend on (a) whether the PV really cannot 
provide the needed support and (b) how close the hospital is to CSC. Long-term 
ventilator users often have specialized expertise in how to adjust their ventilators 
for changing needs, so healthcare professionals should partner with these patients 
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and share their own expertise as much as possible early in admission. If the triage 
criteria are such that the patient might not receive the full-featured ventilator, this 
may or may not be equitable allocation depending on the criteria and one’s 
conception of equity, which is unfortunately outside the scope of this paper. 
TRIAGE ALLOCATIONS AND DISABILITY JUSTICE 
 As physicians and scientists have more time and data points to understand the 
trajectory of the novel coronavirus, they may determine that they can provide 
more and better care without relying so heavily on ventilators. While less-invasive 
methods such as BiPAP and CPAP may aerosolize secretions and pose risk to 
healthcare workers and other patients, high-flow nasal cannula could be as 
effective as intubation and mechanical ventilation yet without the many harmful 
side effects from long-term intubation. 
As relevant as those facts are, the import of our analysis holds even if it is 
determined that ventilator use is ineffective for the COIVD-19 pandemic. Our 
arguments that the practice of PVR should be denied in all cases do not turn on 
the effectiveness of ventilators in CSC, but upon the ethical considerations of the 
experience of PV use. Furthermore, we have not provided an argument deduced 
from principles—whether non-maleficence, efficiency, efficacy, the public good, 
or what have you—but instead an argument from the moral claims that arise from 
how people experience their lives. 
We take the further implications of our arguments to extend to at least the 
following two claims. First, insofar as healthcare systems aim to both form a 
productive partnership with the disability community and also aim to deliver just 
and equitable care for patient populations at large, decision-making and 
deliberation concerning both policies and day-to-day clinical dilemmas should 
involve disability perspectives. Ideally, this should come from people inside of 
disability communities and, where that is impossible, disability allies and 
advocates. The integration of the perspective, experiences, and reflections of 
people with disabilities will only improve the ideal of just and equitable delivery 
of healthcare.40  
Second, the moral distinction for which we have here argued, based as it is upon 
the lived experience of PV users, displays the broader analytic and clinical import 
of analysis grounded in first-person as opposed to merely third-person analysis. 
Third-person analyses arising from domains ranging from clinical biomedical 
research to quantitative sociology are profoundly valuable. We find, however, that 
as valuable as such analyses are, they are significantly bolstered, especially with 
respect to ethical considerations, when supported and/or amended by first-person 
perspectives arising from phenomenological and other forms of qualitative 
analysis. 
Furthermore, we contend that certain biomedical dilemmas, specifically with 
respect to their normative dimensions, will be poorly addressed except insofar as 
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they are ultimately grounded in the latter and not the former. It is in the light of 
these considerations that we have argued that taking away someone’s PV is a 
direct assault on their bodily and social integrity, that PVs should not be part of 
reallocation pools, and that triage protocols should be immediately clarified and 
explicitly state that PVs will be protected in all cases. 
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